Approved For Release 2011/01/18 : CIA-RDP85M00363R000400730008-4

OBLIGATIONS

Approved For Release 2011/01/18 : CIA-RDP85M00363R000400730008-4

KRASNOYARSK RADAR

IUP DEUNIT

OBLIGATIONS -- SALT I ABM TREATY

- -- The SALT I ABM Treaty of 1972 prohibits deployment or development of a basis for a national ABM defense system. It permits research and development and permits one regional system centered in a radius of 150 kilometers around the national capital.
- -- It forbids more than six Early Warning radar complexes per country, and states that all future Early Warning radars must be located along the periphery of the national territory and must be oriented outward.
- -- There are other complex issues involving output and size of the radar and use of radars for tracking of objects in outer space and as a national technical means of verification.

TOP SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

TOP SECRET

TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION

OBLIGATIONS -- SALT II

- Article XV of SALT II (reaffirming SALT I) prohibits interference with National Technical Means (NTM) of verification of other parties and obligates parties not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by NTM of compliance with the Treaty.
- The Second Common Understanding of SALT II allows parties to use various methods of transmitting telemetric information during testing, including encryption, except when encryption impedes verification of compliance.

TOP SECRET

SS-X-25 MISSILE

OBLIGATIONS -- SALT II

- New Type. Article IV, paragraph 9, prohibits flight-test or deployment of new types of ICBMs, not flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, except one new-type light ICBM for each side.
- Five Percent Modernization Rule. The Second Common Understanding to Article IV, paragraph 9, provides that the length, maximum diameter, launch-weight, and throw-weight of a "modernized version of an existing type ICBM may not differ from characteristics of preexisting missiles by more than 5 percent."
- Fifty Percent Rule. Article IV, paragraph 10, Third Agreed Statement, prohibits flight-testing of an ICBM, with a single reentry vehicle and an appropriate device for targeting a reentry vehicle, with a reentry vehicle the weight of which is less than 50 percent of the throw-weight of that ICBM.

TOP SECRET

<u>ss-16</u>

OBLIGATIONS -- SALT II

- -- Article IV, paragraph 8, prohibits conversion of land-based launchers of ballistic missiles which are not ICBMs into launchers of ICBMs and testing them for that purpose.
- The Common Understanding associated with paragraph 8 obligates the USSR not to produce, test, or deploy the SS-16 (RS-14), not to produce the third stage of that missile or the appropriate device for targeting reentry of the SS-16.
- -- Article VI defines the SALT II limitations to include arms which are: (a) operational; (b) in the final stage of construction; (c) in reserve, in storage, or mothballed; and (d) undergoing overhaul, repair, modernization, or conversion.

Approved For Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85M00363R000400730008-4

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRE

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

OBLIGATIONS

- -- The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and of analogous liquids, materials, or devices and of bacteriological methods of warfare.
- The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC).

 Article I prohibits development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of biological agents or toxins and means of delivery for hostile purposes. Article II prohibits transfer of such items. Article IV obligates Parties to take measures to assure that Article I is carried out.

TOP SECRET

THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

OBLIGATIONS -- THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY OF 1976

- -- Prohibits underground nuclear weapons tests having yields exceeding 150 kilotons.
- -- According to an Understanding, occasional, minor, unintended breaches may infrequently occur and would not be considered violations.

TOP SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

HELSINKI FINAL ACT -- 1975

OBLIGATIONS

- The signatories of the Helsinki Final Act are required by the Act's "documents on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament" to give a prior notification of "major military maneuvers exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with possible air or naval components."
- -- In addition, signatories are encouraged to engage in other confidence-building measures on a voluntary basis. These voluntary CBMs include inviting observers to maneuvers, military exchange visits, prior notification of major military movements, and prior notification of exercises involving fewer than 25,000 troops.